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Abstract: 
Public policies are the result of efforts made by governments to alter aspects of 
behaviour – both that of their own agents and of society at large - in order to carry out 
some end or purpose. They are comprised of complex arrangements of policy goals and 
policy means matched through some decision-making process. These policy-making 
efforts can be more or less systematic in attempting to match ends and means in a logical 
fashion or can result from much less systematic or rational processes. “Policy design” 
implies a knowledge-based process in which the choice of means or mechanisms through 
which policy goals are given effect follows a logical process of inference from known or 
learned relationships between means and outcomes. This includes both ‘good design’ in 
which means are selected in accordance with experience and knowledge and ‘bad’ or 
poor design in which principles and relationships are incorrectly or only partially 
articulated or understood. In other circumstances, however, policy decisions are more 
highly contingent and driven by situational logics, bargaining or opportunism than result 
from careful deliberation and assessment. To distinguish these from poor design, these 
results can be thought of as “non-designs”. This paper considers the question of both 
design and non-design modes and formulates a spectrum of policy formulation types 
which helps clarify the nature of each type and the likelihood of each type of policy 
process unfolding.  
 
 
Introduction: Policy Design Studies Past and Future 
A roadmap for a new “policy design orientation” exists in studies undertaken in 
recent years into the formulation of complex policy mixes in fields such as energy and 
environmental policy, among others (Howlett and Lejano 2013, Howlett et al 2014; 
Howlett 2014). This new design orientation focuses attention on the construction of 
policy packages operating in complex multi-policy and multi-level design contexts and 
expected to address multiple goals and objectives (del Rio and Howlett 2013). It seeks to 
better describe the nature of the bundles or portfolios of tools which can be used to 
address policy problems and to help understand the interactive effects which occur when 
multiple tools are used over time.  
The research agenda of the new design orientation is focused on questions which 
the earlier literature largely neglected, such as the trade-offs existing between different 
tools in complex policy mixes and how to deal with the synergies and conflicts which 
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result from tool interactions, as well as the different means and patterns – such as 
layering - through which policy mixes evolve over time (Thelen 2004). This ‘toolbox’ 
and temporal emphasis distinguishes this new approach from earlier efforts towards 
understanding policy formulation which tended to focus on single tool choices in simple 
(level, time and space delimited) policy contexts (del Rio and Howlett 2013).  
This orientation, however, raises the issue of the difference between design and 
non-design processes and the frequency or likelihood of occurrence of each. That is, not 
all policy-making is logic or knowledge driven and it is debatable how closely policy-
makers approximate the instrumental logic and reasoning which characterizes a design 
situation (Howlett et al 2009). Many formulation situations, for example, involve 
information and knowledge limits (“poor design”) or involve multiple actors whose 
relationships may be more adversarial or competitive than is typically associated with a 
‘design’ process and outcome (“non-design”) (Schon 1988; Gero 1990). 
This paper addresses the differences between good and poor design and ‘non-
design’ policy-making processes and the likelihood of each occurring. By engaging in a 
discussion of intentionality in policy designs – whether towards public interest or more 
politically driven opportunism – and of the capacity of governments to undertake design 
efforts, the paper develops a typology of the several formulation processes that exist 
between pure design and more contingent non-design ones. 
 
What is Policy Design? 
Policy design involves the deliberate and conscious attempt to define policy goals and 
connect them in an instrumental fashion to instruments or tools expected to realize those 
objectives (Majone 1975; May 2003; Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012). Policy design, 
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in this sense, is a specific form of policy formulation based on the gathering of 
knowledge of the effects of policy tool use on policy targets and its application to the 
development and implementation of policies aimed at the attainment of specific desired 
policy outcomes and ambitions (Weaver 2009 and 2010; Bobrow and Dryzek 1987; 
Bobrow 2006; Montpetit 2003).  
 Within the policy sciences, ‘design’ has been linked both to studies of policy 
instruments and implementation (May 2003) and of the impact of policy ideas and advice 
on policy formulation (Linder and Peters 1990). In this sense, policy designs can be seen 
to contain both a substantive component – a set of alternative arrangements thought 
potentially capable of resolving or addressing some aspect of a policy problem, one or 
more of which is ultimately put into practice – as well as a procedural component – a set 
of activities related to securing some level of agreement among those charged with 
formulating, deciding upon, and administering that alternative on its relative merits vis-à-
vis other alternatives (Howlett 2011). Design thus overlaps and straddles both policy 
formulation and policy implementation and involves actors, ideas and interests present at 
both these stages of the policy process (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 2009). However it also 
posits a very specific form of interaction among these elements, driven by knowledge and 
evidence of alternatives’ merits and demerits in achieving policy goals. 
Conceptually, a policy design process begins with the analysis of the abilities of 
different kinds of policy tools to affect policy outputs and outcomes and the kinds of 
resources required to allow them to operate as intended (Salamon 2002; Hood 1986). 
This instrumental knowledge is contextual in the sense that it requires a special 
understandings of how the use of specific kinds of instruments affects target group 
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behaviour and compliance with government aims. It thus includes knowledge and 
consideration of many constraints on tool use originating in the limits of existing 
knowledge, prevailing governance structures, and other arrangements which may 
preclude certain options and promote others (Howlett 2009 and 2011). It also requires 
government analytical and evidentiary capacity as well as the intention to exercise it. 
Such a means-ends understanding permeates the policy design orientation to 
policy-making but, of course, is only one possible orientation or set of practices which 
can be followed in policy formulation and result in policy-outputs (Tribe 1972; Colebatch 
1998). In the design case policy formulators are expected to base their analyses on logic, 
knowledge and experience rather than, for example, purely political calculations or 
bargaining or other forms of satisficing behaviour which characterize other forms of 
alternative generation (Sidney 2007; Bendor et al 2009). These other forms can be termed 
‘non-design’ ones. 
Policy design studies, of course, acknowledge that not all policy work is rational 
in this instrumental sense and often deals with the vagaries of policy formulation 
processes by separating out two dimensions of the design experience: on the one hand the 
exploration of the procedural aspects of design – the specific types of policy formulation 
activities which lead to design rather than some other form of policy generation - and on 
the other the substantive  components – that is, the substance or content of the design 
itself in terms of the instruments and instrument setting of which it is composed. This is 
the policy-relevant articulation of the well known distinction in design studies generally 
between ‘design-as-verb’ (‘policy formulation’) and ‘design-as-noun’ (policy tools and 
instruments).1  
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The idea is that even when policy processes are more contingent, the design of a 
policy, conceptually at least, can be divorced from the processes involved in its actual 
creation. Thus regardless of the nature of actual alternative formulation in a specific 
context, it is still possible to imagine a more instrumental world and hence consider 
design alternatives “in-themselves” as ideal-type artifacts which can be developed and 
studied in preparation for decision-making circumstances which might be propitious to 
their adoption either in ‘pure’ form or with some minor adjustments or amendments. Of 
course this is the bread-and-butter of policy analytical work undertaken by think tanks, 
policy institutes and policy schools which generally criticize existing arrangements and 
propose more ‘rational’ alternatives; that is, ones felt more likely in the abstract or in 
practice to achieve their goals. 
Again, however, this does not preclude, but rather is built upon the recognition 
and acceptance of the fact that some policy decisions and formulation processes are 
highly contingent ones in which ‘design’ considerations may be more or less absent and 
where the logical or empirical relations between policy components are ignored (Kingdon 
1984; Cohen, March and Olsen 1979; Dryzek 1983; Eijlander 2005; Franchino and 
Hoyland 2009; Sager and Rielle 2013). This includes a variety of contexts in which 
formulators, for example, may engage in trade-offs or log-rolling between different 
values or resource uses or, more extremely, engage in venal or corrupt behaviour in 
which personal gain from a decision may trump other evaluative criteria. These are ‘non-
design’ situations and the extent to which such considerations as political gain or blame 
avoidance calculations outweigh instrumental factors in policy formulation is an 
empirical question, however, and can be studied systematically (Hood 2010).  
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As Junginger (2013) recently argued, however, at the present time we continue to 
know too little about many important aspects of design and non-design work, especially 
about the nature of the kinds of policy formulation activities which bring about either 
result. As she put it, we know very little about  “the actual activities of designing that 
bring policies into being – of how people involved in the creation of policies go about 
identifying design problems and design criteria, about the methods they employ in their 
design process ” (p. 3). 
That is, while many commentators, pundits and jaded or more cynical members of 
the public may assume that all policy-making is ‘political’ and hence irrational in a 
design sense, policy scholars have noted many instances in which processes of policy 
formulation are governed less by considerations of interest accommodation and 
bargaining than by concerns about criteria such as the practical efficiency and 
effectiveness of policy alternatives which involve policy formulators thinking more 
systematically and analytically about their options (Bobrow and Dryzek 1987; Bobrow 
2006). This highlights the continued need for better understanding the mechanics of 
policy formulation involved in translating ideal-type models into context-sensitive 
solutions to public problems (Linder and Peters 1988; Wintges 2007) and to distinguish 
more carefully between design and non-design processes. 
 
What is Policy Non-Design? 
The academic enquiry of policy design – that is, self-consciously dealing with both policy 
processes and substance under an instrumental rubric - emerged and flourished 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see for example, Salamon 1981, 1989 and 2002). 
Studies of policy design with this general orientation towards policy formulation began at 
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the very origins of the policy sciences when many pivotal early works contained within 
them the idea of improving policy outcomes through the more systematic application of 
knowledge to policy formulation activities (Lasswell and Lerner 1951; Wildavsky 1979; 
May 2003).2  
 In his foundational work on the policy sciences, for example, Harold Lasswell 
argued for the separation of the processes of policy formulation from decision-making 
and implementation, highlighting the centrality and significance of policy instruments 
and instrument choices made in the formulation process for policy outcomes and arguing 
for the need to bring interdisciplinary knowledge to bear on the development of the 
appropriate means to resolve public problems and issues (Lasswell, 1954). 
 For the “old” policy design studies which emerged from this foundational work, the 
historical and the institutional context of policy-making was seen to bear significant 
weight in policy formulation, and this was often argued to be determinant of both the 
content and activities of designs and designing (Clemens and Cook 1999). In this view, as 
the policy context and conditions changed and evolved, so too did the set of policy means 
or alternatives which were deemed acceptable or feasible by an evolving set of policy 
actors involved in policy-making, themselves informed by shifting ideas and calculations 
of the appropriateness of a particular design and its consequences (Majone 1975 and 
1976; March and Olsen 2004; Goldmann 2005; Howlett 2011). 
 This highly contextual orientation in early policy studies (Torgerson 1985 and 
1990) led some policy scholars in the 1970s to argue that policy decisions were by nature 
the result of processes so highly contingent and fraught with uncertainty that decision-
making would invariably involve a high degree of ‘irrationality’; that is, be informed 
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more by the opportunistic behaviour of decision-makers within fluid policy-making 
contexts than by careful deliberation and ‘design’ thinking about the logical or functional 
merits and demerits of specific alternative arrangements of policy goals and means 
(Lindblom 1959; Cohen et al. 1979; Dryzek 1983; Kingdon 1984).3  This led some to 
express serious doubts that policy could truly be ‘designed’ in the way that proponents of 
a policy design orientation advocated (Dryzek and Ripley 1988; deLeon 1988).  
 Many other scholars, however, questioned the extent of this emphasis on 
contextuality and contingency (Dror 1964) and in a series of path-breaking articles in the 
1980s and early 1990s authors such as Linder and Peters (1984; 1988; 1990; 1990a; 
1990b; 1990c and 1991) sought to re-orient design studies by arguing that the process of 
policy designing as a type of formulation activity was conceptually distinct from a policy 
design, in the same way that an analytical distinction can be made between the 
development of an abstract concept or plan in architecture and the manifestation of that 
conception through engineering and construction practices followed on the ground 
(Schon 1988, 1992).   
 Incorporating this distinction between design-as-formulation-process and design-as-
policy-content, design studies in the 1980s shifted from the study of ‘designing’ to the 
study of ‘designs’ themselves, with a specific focus on better understanding how 
individual implementation-related policy tools and instruments such as taxes and 
subsidies or regulation and public ownership operated in theory and practice (Sterner 
2003; Woodside 1986; Mayntz 1979). This marked the beginning of modern studies of 
policy tools and this tools orientation sparked interest in a range of related subjects, such 
as the study of target group behaviour, implementation failures and their role in policy 
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success, and the linkages connecting the two; with policy scholars turning their attention 
to the description and classification of alternative implementation instruments and the 
factors which conditioned their effective use and deployment (Mayntz 1979; O’Toole 
2000; Goggin et al 1990; Schneider and Ingram (1990; 1990a; 1994). These works 
provided a deeper understanding of the social and behavioural factors underpinning the 
use of specific kinds of policy designs in practice.4 
 Students of public policy making were joined in this effort by scholars of 
economics and law who studied the evaluation of policy outputs in terms of their impacts 
on outcomes as well as the role of law and legislation in effecting policy tool choices and 
designs (Stokey and Zeckhauser 1978; Bobrow and Dryzek 1987; Keyes 1996). And 
studies in management and administration at the time also sought to explore the linkages 
between politics, administration and implementation in the effort to better understand 
policy tool choices and patterns of use (Trebilcock and Hartle 1982). Researchers also 
looked at how policy instrument choices tended to shift over time (Lowi 1966, 1972 and 
1985), examples of which during this period included the rise of privatization and 
deregulation (Howlett and Ramesh 1993) and the first wave of governance thinking 
advocating the use of network management or non-governmental tools (Peters and Pierre 
1998).5 
  By the early 1980s, this tools literature had merged with the policy design 
orientation and emerged as a body of policy design literature in its own right. Students of 
policy design consequently embarked upon theory building, developing more and better 
typologies of policy instruments that sought to aid the conceptualization of these 
instruments and their similarities and differences, and attempting to provide a greater 
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understanding of the motivations and reasons underlying their use (Salamon 1981; 
Tupper and Doern 1981; Hood 1986; Bressers and Honigh 1986; Bressers and Klok 
1988; Trebilcock and Hartle 1982). Other scholarly work during this period continued to 
further elucidate the nature and use of specific policy tools, especially tools such as 
“command-and-control” regulations and financial inducements such as tax incentives but 
also many others (Landry, Varone and Goggin 1998; Tupper and Doern 1981; Hood, 
1986; Vedung et al 1997; Howlett 1991).  
 In general it was believed that a greater understanding of implementation 
instruments and the reasons underlying instrument choice would benefit policy design 
both as a practice and a theoretical body of knowledge, contributing to more positive 
policy outcomes (Woodside 1986; Linder and Peters 1984; Mayntz 1979). Studies on 
pollution prevention and professional regulation conducted at the time, for example, 
benefited from advances in the systematic study of policy instruments which influenced 
the design and creation of new alternative instruments in these and other fields (Hippes 
1988; Trebilcock and Prichard 1983).  
Most of this work focused on tool design-as-a-noun, however, and ignored the 
issues involved in policy-design-as-formulation-process. Understanding the difference 
between “non-design” and design thus remains very much a part of the outstanding 
research agenda in contemporary policy design studies. 
 
Modeling Non-Design: Revisiting the Pre-Conditions of Policy Design 
 The modern policy studies movement began with the recognition that public policy-
making results from the interactions of policy-makers in the exercise of power, legitimate 
or otherwise (Lasswell 1958; Arts and van Tatenhove 2004; Stone 1988). Although some 
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of these policy-making efforts could be seen to be arbitrary or capricious, most were 
viewed as representing the concerted efforts of governments to act instrumentally; that is, 
to achieve a particular policy goal or end through the use of a set of relatively well known 
set of policy means developed over many years of state-building and experience 
(Lasswell and Lerner 1951). It was acknowledged that these goals can be wide-ranging 
and often posed no small amount of difficulty and complexity in both their definition and 
diagnosis, with the implication that the formulation of solutions that were likely to 
succeed in addressing them necessitated the systematic consideration of the impact and 
feasibility of the use of specific kinds of policy means or instruments (Parsons 1995 and 
2001).  
This work thus depicted policy design as a specific kind of policy-making in 
which knowledge of the policy impacts of specific policy tools was combined with the 
practical capacity of governments to identify and implement the most suitable technical 
means in the effort to achieve a specific policy aim. This activity was expected to occur 
ex ante and independently of other considerations such as political or personal gain which 
might also affect formulation processes. Significantly, this ‘design’ activity was 
recognized as requiring a situation where there was support for knowledge-based policy 
analysis and design work on the part of policy-makers and also one where there is a low 
policy “lock-in” on existing tool arrangements which could preclude adoption of superior 
alternatives.  
Such favorable design circumstances had to be coupled with the presence of a 
high level of technical capacity and expertise on the part of policy analysts if knowledge 
was to be mobilized effectively so that policy instruments were effectively and efficiently 
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matched to policy goals and targets (Howlett 2009 and 2010; Dunlop 2009; Radaelli and 
Dunlop 2013; Howlett and Rayner 2014).  
When all such conditions are present, purposive design activity resulting in good 
alternative generation and assessment was thought to be possible, much as is expected in 
the current era with recent efforts at improving knowledge mobilization in policy-making 
in the form of an emphasis upon ‘evidence-based policy-making’ (Bhatta 2002; Locke 
2009). When they are not, however, either poor designs could ensue from incomplete 
knowledge and information even with the best government intent, or less technical and 
more overtly political forms of non-design policy-making are more likely to ensue 
(Davies 2004; Moseley and Tierney 2004; Howlett 2009b). The fervent wish of 
proponents of the early design orientation was to reduce both these instances of poor and 
non-design to as few as possible by promoting the kinds of orientations and dedication of 
resources required for better design processes to occur. This, in turn was expected to 
result in policies more likely to solve pressing problems, correct social ills and serve the 
public good (Bobrow 2006; Azuela and Barroso 2012). 
Figure 1 presents a schematic illustrating how different policy formulation spaces 
result in very different policy design processes. The intention to design is a key factor 
determining whether a process will be a design or non-design one while the  presence of 
significant policy constraints  affects whether or not policy formulation can proceed in  a 
logical manner regardless of its design or non-design character  
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Figure 1 – Types of Policy Formulation Processes: Situating Design Spaces 
 Government Knowledge and Other Constraints 
  High Low 
Government 
Intention to 
Design 
High Optimal Design Space 
– Relatively unconstrained 
formulation via design  is 
possible  
 
Poor Design Space 
- Only partially informed 
design is possible 
 
Low Political Non-Design 
Space 
- Relatively unconstrained 
non-design processes are 
possible 
Poor Non-Design Space 
- Only poorly informed 
non-design is possible 
 
Developing a Spectrum of Design and Non-Design Activities: The Significance of 
Layering and Temporality 
 
In itself this suggests that a spectrum of design and non-design formulation 
processes exists between “good” processes which are informed and “poor” ones which 
are not. However in order to be more precise about the nature of these processes, it is 
necessary to examine the nature of some of the other constraints on government 
intentions which can negatively affect both design and non-design processes  
Here scholars in the new design orientation have been concerned with factors 
such as how policy processes can be affected by the previous existence of a policy design. 
That is, not all design processes, in fact very few, begin de novo. Most must deal with 
already created policies and are limited by these historical legacies, which can be 
hampered due to internal inconsistencies. Although other policy instrument groupings 
can be more successful in creating an internally supportive combination (Howlett and 
Rayner 2007, Grabosky 1994, Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair 1998, del Rio 2010) it 
may be very difficult to accomplish or propose wholesale change and designs instead will 
often tend to focus on reform rather than replacement of an existing arrangement.   In this 
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case legacies from earlier rounds of decision-making affect the introduction of new 
elements which conflict with pre-existing policy components. Policy development 
strongly marked in this way is typically one where new elements were added to the 
policy mix without the removal of older ones and existing elements are stretched to try to 
fit new goals and changing circumstances. This creates a mix that contained various 
incompatibilities, tending to frustrate the achievement of policy goals. 
A key concept in this regard is that of ‘layering” (van der Heijden 2011) or the 
result of (re)design in altering only some aspects of a pre-existing arrangement and it is a 
distinction between different types of layering which allows us to further distinguish 
different kinds of design and non-design processes from each other.  
Layering, of course is a concept developed in the neo-institutional sociological 
literature by some of its leading figures, namely Beland (2007), Thelen (2004), Hacker 
(2004); Beland and Hacker (2004); and Stead and Meijers (2004) to explain the pattern 
through which social and political institutions have evolved over long-periods of time. As 
applied to policy-making, ‘layering’ connotes a process in which new elements are 
simply added to an existing regime often without abandoning previous ones so that 
polices accrete in a palimpsest-like fashion (Carter 2012).  
 This adds a second, temporal, dimension to design and non-design formulation 
contexts that most early policy design studies neglected. That is, most design studies have 
focused on what in fact is the exceptional case of ‘replacement’ or ‘exhaustion’ in which 
an existing policy is scrapped and a new one adopted in its entirety. However this is not a 
common event. Much more common is some process of layering in which some aspects 
of a policy are layered on top of pre-existing ones. 
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This context ‘lock in’ can impact the formulation process by restricting a 
government’s ability to evaluate alternatives and plan or design in a purely instrumental 
manner (Howlett 2009; Oliphant and Howlett 2010; Williams 2012).  This is an issue in 
part for temporal reasons as policy arrangements are often the result of transformation 
pathways that can easily lead to internal contradictions emerging between tools and goals 
within policy mixes (Hacker 2004). Mixes of policy elements may emerge over long 
stretches of time as a result of successive policy decisions which are not necessarily 
congruent. As a result, even when the initial logic of each decision matching policy tool 
and target may have been clear, through multiple layering  processes they can gradually 
transform into degenerated mixes over time (van der Heijden 2011, Bode 2006; Howlett 
and Rayner 1995, Orren and Skowronek 1998, Rayner et al. 2001, Torenvlied and 
Akkerman 2004, Hacker 2004).  
Optimizing the choice of instruments when a pre-existing mix exists thus requires 
an additional level of knowledge of instrument-goal interactions and considerations of 
both long and short-term processes of policy change. That is, in addition to questions 
relating to the logic of integration of policy tools, the evolution and history of existing 
policy mixes are also of concern. While the old orientation tended to suggest that design 
would always occur in spaces where policy packages could be designed ‘en bloc’, the 
new orientation recognizes that most design circumstances involve building on the 
foundations created in another era, working within already sub-optimal design spaces 
(Howlett and Rayner 2013).  
In such situations of significant policy legacies, designers often attempt to “patch” 
or restructure existing policy elements rather than propose completely new alternative 
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arrangements even if the situation may require the latter for the sake of coherence and 
consistency in the reformed policy mix” (Howlett 2013; Gunningham and Sinclair 1999; 
Thelen et al. 2003; Thelen 2004; Eliadis et al. 2005). Hence even where intentionality to 
design may be high it may only be partial in the sense that patching and not replacement 
is on the table. 
Hence a key first distinction among design formulation processes concerns 
whether they involve ‘packaging’ a new policy mix or ‘patching’ an old one. Layering is 
often thought to be inherently sub-optimal but ‘patching’ in itself is not ‘non-design’, as 
very often the new layer is designed in an effort to overcome anomalies or problems with 
earlier mixes (Howlett and Rayner 2013). Policy design scholars are thus very interested 
in processes such as how policy formulators, like  software designers, can issue such 
‘patches’ to correct flaws in existing mixes or allow them to adapt to changing 
circumstances (Rayner 2013; Howlett 2013, Howlett and Rayner 2013). And they are 
also interested in related subjects such as how policy experiments can help reveal the 
possibilities of re-design (Hoffman 2011) or how building temporal properties into tool 
mixes – “adaptive policy-making” (Swanson et al 2010) - can make designs more flexible 
or resistant to shifting conditions (Walker et al. 2010, Haasnoot et al. 2013). Patching can 
be either a form of ‘smart’ layering if done well, or not so smart if done poorly.  
Another second phenomenon which can occur as layering unfolds is ‘stretching’ 
(Feindt and Flynn 2009). This is where, operating over periods of decades or more, 
elements of a mix are simply extended to cover areas they were not intended to at the 
outset. “Stretching” is especially problematic as small changes in the mixture of policy 
elements over a decade or more can create a situation where the elements can fail to be 
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mutually supportive, incorporating contradictory goals or instruments whose combination 
create perverse incentives that frustrate initial policy goals. When these problems are 
identified, they set the stage for further rounds of tinkering that may make them worse 
(Feindt and Flynn 2009). This second process is associated with a particular form of 
‘tense layering’ (Kay 2007) which occurs when repeated bouts of layering lead to both 
incoherence amongst the goals and inconsistency with respect to the instruments and 
settings used in a policy area. As Kay (2007) and Feindt and Flynn (2009) noted, 
destructive layering can be initiated by a process of stretching the regulatory framework 
to accommodate new and potentially incoherent policy goals. In such cases tense layering 
introduces progressively more severe inconsistencies and incongruences and tensions 
between layers.  
Stretching is more problematic as a design process than patching since the 
addition of new goals or objectives increases the risk of incoherence, as does the 
introduction of policy instruments that suppose new kinds of implementation preferences, 
for example, when a market orientation is introduced into an instrument set that has been 
based on a regulatory approach (Howlett and Rayner 2007).  Inconsistencies also arise 
where the means work at cross-purposes, “providing simultaneous incentives and 
disincentives towards the attainment of stated goals” (Kern and Howlett, 2009: 6). And 
incongruence occurs when an otherwise consistent mix of instruments fail to support the 
goals.   
Layering thus has two sides to it. On the one hand negative stretching or destructive 
layering exacerbates tensions between regime elements and leads to wholesale change. 
However layering can also have a positive side and help ameliorate or reduce tensions 
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through patching. Moderate layering can be successfully accommodated through a 
process of learning and patching, leading to a policy mix that exhibits a high degree of 
coherence, consistency and congruence.  Both these processes fall between the design 
and non-design ends of a spectrum of design processes which moves from highly 
intentional and instrumental replacement efforts to those which are more partial and less 
intentional such as ‘smart’ patching and ultimately to those which involve poor design 
such as ‘stretching’ and poor or ‘dumb’ layering (see figure 2 below).  
 
Figure 2: A Spectrum of Policy Design Types 
Good and Bad Replacement-Smart Patching-Dumb Layering- Stretching-Non-Design 
 
|------- extent of attempted or possible alteration of status quo by design type ------------| 
 
 All of these design efforts can be done well or poorly but reflect some wholesale 
or partial effort to match policy goals and means in a sophisticated way linked to 
improving outcomes. Non-design types also vary in the same way but more by process of 
decision-making than by their sphere of activity. Non-design mechanisms, as highlighted 
above, include activities such as alternative generation by bargaining or log-rolling, 
through corruption or co-optation efforts or through other means which are not 
instrumental in the same sense as are design efforts. Again such efforts can also be done 
poorly or well (for example, maximizing the return from a bargain or the returns from 
corruption) depending on the context and situation but do not involve the same appraisal 
activities and competences or intentions on the part of governments (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: A Spectrum of Policy Non-Design Types  
 
These processes vary in terms of the extent to which the policy goal is linked to 
individual and political interests rather than public ones. Most have been studied 
extensively in the political science literature but less systematically in the policy sciences 
(Saward 1992; Goodin 1980; Frye et al 2012; Gans-Morse et al 2014). 
 
Conclusion: Distinguishing Design from Non-Design-Based Formulation 
Transforming policy ambitions into practice is a complex process. The efforts of policy 
makers often have failed due to poor designs which have inadequately incorporated this 
complexity in policy formulation (Howlett 2012; Cohn 2004). These experiences have 
led to a greater awareness of the various obstacles that can present themselves to policy 
design and have gradually fueled a desire for better understandings of the unique 
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characteristics of policy formulation processes and the spaces in which design efforts are 
embedded.  
 The new design orientation calls for a broadening of thinking about design beyond 
policy tool choices, examining combinations of substantive and procedural instruments 
and their interactions in complex policy mixes. It also has focused on more detailed study 
of the actual formulation processes involved in tool and design choices as these occur and 
have evolved over time (Linder and Peters 1990; Schneider and Ingram 1997; Considine 
2012).  
 As the discussion here has shown, both design and non-design formulation 
processes are not unique but vary along several important dimensions. For design 
situations – that is those characterized by a government desire to systematically match 
ends and means in the attainment of policy goals, the processes vary according to the 
nature of the resources available for design purposes and the constraints imposed by 
policy legacies, with the latter generating non-replacement spaces in which processes 
such as patching and stretching unfold. In the non-design world where the intention to 
design is lacking, constraints on outcomes also exist as do different processes which vary 
in their distance from the design ideal of public service and improving the public good 
(Holmberg and Rothstein 2012; Rotberg 2014). 
 Students of policy design must be aware of these differences and the situations 
governments are in or want to be in while developing policy options and making 
recommendations and providing advice to governments. More systematic study of these 
formulation contexts and processes can help move this area of policy design studies 
forward. 
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Endnotes
                                                        
1 This is similar to the general orientation towards design found in other fields such as 
architecture, urban planning or industrial design. See Hillier, Musgrove and O’Sullivan 1972; 
Hillier and Leaman 1974; Gero 1990. 
2 Policy design studies have been undertaken since at least the 1950s (Tinbergen 1952; Dahl and 
Lindblom 1953; Kirschen et al 1964). Most of the early studies focused on policy tools and had a 
strong focus on policy implementation issues and processes; paying much less attention to policy 
development or formulation issues which are the hallmark of current studies with a design 
orientation (Hood 1986; Hood and Margetts 2007). 
3 Of course this is a view some continue to hold. See for example Eijlander 2005; Franchino and 
Hoyland 2009.  
4 Subsequent contributions would further advance the study of the behavioural aspects of the 
design process and raised the issue of the difference between design and non-design to the fore 
(Ingram and Schneider 1990; Schneider and Ingram 1997; Mondou and Montpetit 
2010;Timmermans et al 1998; Hood 2007). At this time, for example, Bardach (1980) and 
Salamon (1981) went so far as to argue that the definition of policy in terms of “issues” or 
“problems” originally made by scholars at the outset of the policy studies movement (Mintrom 
2007) was misguided and that policy should instead have been defined from the start in terms of 
the “instruments” used in policy-making. They advocated shifting the focus of policy studies 
squarely towards the study of the design and operation of such tools, later defined to include both 
traditional ‘substantive’ tools such as regulation and public ownership and more ‘procedural’ 
ones such as the use of advisory commissions and public participation exercises (Howlett 2000).  
5 Of course, not all work on policy instruments has restricted itself to implementation issues. 
Work on the exploration of “instrumentation” for example, has considered larger issues about 
feedback processes from instrument choices to the politics of policy formation, as has some work 
on instruments and network governance (see Lascoumes and Legales 2007 and de Bruijn and ten 
Heuvelhof 1997). However these can still be distinguished from the new design studies, given the 
latter’s almost exclusive emphasis on formulation and its resulting concern for understanding the 
inherent nuances involved in developing mechanisms for meeting policy goals, couched within 
contextual realities, which the former studies still lack.  
 
References  
  
Anderson, J. E. Public Policymaking. New York: Praeger, 1975.   
Arts, B., and J. Van Tatenhove. “Policy and Power: A Conceptual Framework Between the ‘Old’ 
and ’New’ Policy Idioms.” Policy Sciences 37 (2004): 339–356. 
Azuela, Gabriela Elizondo, and Luiz Augusto Barroso. Design and Performance of Policy 
Instruments to Promote the Development of Renewable Energy: Emerging Experience in 
Selected Developing Countries. World Bank Publications, 2012. 
Bardach, E. (1980). Implementation Studies and the Study of Implements. Paper presented to the 
American Political Science Association.  
Barnett, C. K., & Shore, B. (2009). Reinventing Program Design: Challenges in Leading 
Sustainable Institutional Change. Leadership & Organization, 30,(1), 16-35.  
Beland, D. 2007. Ideas and Institutional Change in Social Security: Conversion, Layering, and 
Policy Drift. Social Science Quarterly. 88(1) 20-38. 
Beland, D. and J. Hacker. 2004 “Ideas, Private Institutions, and American Welfare State 
‘Exceptionalism,’” International Journal of Social Welfare 13:1: 42-54. 
 
 
23 
 
Bendor, Jonathan, Kumar Sunil, and Siegel, David A. “Satisficing: A ‘Pretty Good’ Heuristic.” 
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 9, no. 1 (2009). doi:10.2202/1935-1704.1478. 
Bhatta, G. “Evidence-Based Analysis and the Work of Policy Shops.” Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 61, no. 3 (2002): 98–105. 
Blonz, J. A., Vajjhala, S.P. & Safirova, E. (2008). Growing Complexities: A Cross-Sector Review 
of U.S. Biofuels Policies and Their Interactions . Washington DC: Resources for the Future. 
Bobrow, D. B., and J. S. Dryzek. Policy Analysis by Design. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1987.   
Bobrow, Davis. “Policy Design: Ubiquitous, Necessary and Difficult.” In Handbook of public 
policy, edited by B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, 75-96. SAGE, 2006.   
Bode, I. “Disorganized Welfare Mixes: Voluntary Agencies and New Governance Regimes in 
Western Europe.” Journal of European Social Policy 16, no. 4 (2006): 346-359.   
Boonekamp, Piet G.M. “Actual Interaction Effects Between Policy Measures for Energy 
efficiency--A Qualitative Matrix Method and Quantitative Simulation Results for 
Households.” Energy 31, no. 14 (November 2006): 2848–2873.  
Braathen, N. A., and E. Croci. “Environmental Agreements Used in Combination with Other 
Policy Instruments.” In The Handbook of Environmental Voluntary Agreements Vol 43, 335-
364. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005.   
Braathen, Nils Axel. “Instrument Mixes for Environmental Policy: How Many Stones Should Be 
Used to Kill a Bird?” International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 1, no. 
2 (May 16, 2007): 185–235.  
Braathen, Nils Axel. Instrument Mixes Addressing Non-Point Sources of Water Pollution. Paris: 
OECD, 2007. 
Bressers, H. T. A., and L. J. O'Toole. “Instrument Selection and Implementation in a Networked 
Context.” In Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance, edited by P. Eliadis, 
M. Hill, and M. Howlett, 132-153. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005.   
Bressers, H. T. A., and L. J. O'Toole. “The Selection of Policy Instruments: A Network-based 
Perspective.” Journal of Public Policy 18, no. 3 (1998): 213-239.   
Bressers, H., & Honigh, M. (1986) A Comparative Approach to the Explanation of Policy Effects. 
International Social Science Journal , 108, 267-288.  
Bressers, H., & Klok, P.J.(1988). Fundamentals for a Theory of Policy Instruments. International 
Journal of Social Economics, 15, (3/4), 22-41.  
Briassoulis, H. 2005.  Policy Integration for Complex Environmental Problems. Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Briassoulis, H., ed. Policy Integration for Complex Environmental Problems: The Example of 
Mediterranean Desertification. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. 
Buckman, G., & Diesendorf, M. Design limitations in Australian renewable electricity policies. 
Energy Policy, 38(7) 3365-3376.  
Capano, Giliberto, and Michael Howlett. “The Determinants of Policy Change: Advancing the 
Debate.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 11, no. 1 (2009): 
1–5. 
Capano, Giliberto. “Government continues to do its job. A comparative study of governance 
shifts in the higher education sector”, Public Administration, 89(4), pp. 1622 - 1642, 2011. 
Carter, Pam. “Policy as Palimpsest.” Policy & Politics 40, no. 3 (2012): 423–443.  
Cashore, B. and M. Howlett. 2007. Punctuating What Equilibrium? Institutional Rigidities and 
Thermostatic Properties in Pacific Northwest Forest Policy Dynamics. American Journal of 
Political Science.51(3) 532-551 
Christensen, T., P. Laegreid, and L. R. Wise. “Transforming Administrative Policy.” Public 
Administration 80, no. 1 (2002): 153-179.   
Clemens, E. S., & Cook, J.M. (1999). Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and 
Change. Annual Review of Sociology, 25, 441-466.  
 
 
24 
 
Cohen, M. D., J. G. March, and J. P. Olsen. “People, Problems, Solutions and the Ambiguity of 
Relevance.” In Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, 24–37. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 
1979. 
Cohn, D. “The Best of Intentions, Potentially Harmful Policies: A Comparative Study of 
Scholarly Complexity and Failure.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 6, no. 1 (2004): 
39–56. 
Colebatch, H. K. Policy. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1998. 
Considine, Mark. “Thinking Outside the Box? Applying Design Theory to Public Policy.” 
Politics & Policy 40, no. 4 (2012): 704–724.  
Craft, Jonathan, and Michael Howlett. “Policy Formulation, Governance Shifts and Policy 
Influence: Location and Content in Policy Advisory Systems.” Journal of Public Policy 32, 
no. 02 (2012): 79–98. doi:10.1017/S0143814X12000049. 
Dahl, R. A., and C. E. Lindblom. Politics, Economics and Welfare: Planning and Politico-
economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes. New York: Harper and Row, 1953. 
Davies, P. Is Evidence-Based Government Possible? London, 2004.  
De Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, “Chapter 7: Instruments for Network Management” in Managing 
Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector. W.J.M Kickert, E. H. Klijn and J. F. M. 
Koppenjan eds. Sage Publications, 1997 
Del Rio, Pablo, and Michael P. Howlett. Beyond the “Tinbergen Rule” in Policy Design: 
Matching Tools and Goals in Policy Portfolios. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network, April 8, 2013. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2247238. 
Del Río, Pablo, Anxo Calvo Silvosa, and Guillermo Iglesias Gómez. “Policies and Design 
Elements for the Repowering of Wind Farms: A Qualitative Analysis of Different Options.” 
Energy Policy 39, no. 4 (April 2011): 1897–1908.  
Del Río, Pablo, Javier Carrillo-Hermosilla, and Totti Könnölä. “Policy Strategies to Promote Eco-
Innovation.” Journal of Industrial Ecology (2010).  
Del Río, Pablo. “Analysing the Interactions Between Renewable Energy Promotion and Energy 
Efficiency Support Schemes: The Impact of Different Instruments and Design Elements.” 
Energy Policy 38, no. 9 (September 2010): 4978–4989.  
Del Rio, Pablo. “Interactions Between Climate and Energy Policies: The Case of Spain.” Climate 
Policy 9, no. 2 (2009): 119–138.  
deLeon, P. (1988) The Contextual Burdens of Policy Design. Policy Studies Journal, 17 (2), 297-
309.  
Donovan, M. C. Taking Aim: Target Populations and the Wars on AIDS and Drugs. Washington 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001.    
Doremus, H. “A Policy Portfolio Approach to Biodiversity Protection on Private Lands.” 
Environmental Science & Policy 6 (2003): 217–232. 
Dror, Y. “Muddling Through - ‘Science’ or Inertia.” Public Administration Review. 24, no. 3 
(1964): 154–157. 
Dryzek, J. (1983). Donʼt Toss Coins in Garbage Cans: A Prologue to Policy Design. Journal Of 
Public Policy,  3 (4), 345-367.  
Dryzek, J. S., & Ripley, B. (1988) The Ambitions of Policy Design. Policy Studies Review, 7 (4), 
705-719.   
Dunlop, Claire A. “The Temporal Dimension of Knowledge and the Limits of Policy Appraisal: 
Biofuels Policy in the UK.” Policy Sciences 43, no. 4 (October 2009): 343–363. 
doi:10.1007/s11077-009-9101-7. 
Eijlander, P. “Possibilities and Constraints in the Use of Self-regulation and Co-Regulation in 
Legislative Policy: Experiences in the Netherlands - Lessons to Be Learned for the EU.” 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 9, no. 1 (2005): 1–8. 
Eliadis, F. P., M. M. Hill, and M. Howlett, eds. Designing government: from instruments to 
governance. McGill Queens University Press, 2005.   
 
 
25 
 
Feindt, Peter H. “The Politics of Biopatents in Food and Agriculture, 1950–2010: Value Conflict, 
Competing Paradigms and Contested Institutionalisation in Multi-level Governance.” Policy 
and Society 31, no. 4 (November 2012): 281–293.  
Feindt. P. and A. Flynn. 2009.  Policy Stretching and Institutional Layering: British Food Policy 
Between Security, Safety, Quality, Health and Climate Change, British Politics 4 (3): 386-
414. 
Franchino, Fabio, and Bjorn Hoyland. “Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems: 
Opportunities, Conflict and Institutional Constraints.” American Political Science Review 
103, no. 4 (2009): 607–621. 
Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi. Political Machines at Work: Voter 
Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, 
NY: Social Science Research Network, 2012. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2110201. 
Gans-Morse, Jordan, Sebastián Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. “Varieties of Clientelism: Machine 
Politics during Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 58, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 
415–32. doi:10.1111/ajps.12058. 
Gero, John S. “Design Prototypes: A Knowledge Representation Schema for Design.” 
Text.Serial.Journal, December 15, 1990. 
Gilabert, Pablo and Holly Lawford-Smith, 2012. “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual 
Exploration.” Political Studies 60 (4), 809-825 
Givoni, Moshe, James Macmillen, David Banister, and Eran Feitelson. 2013. “From Policy 
Measures to Policy Packages.” Transport Reviews (forthcoming.): 1–20.  
Goggin, M. L., Bowman A. O. M., Lester, J. P. & OʼToole, L.J. (1990)  Implementation Theory 
and Practice: Toward A Third Generation . Glenview: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown. 
Goldmann, K. (2005) Appropriateness and Consequences: The Logic of Neo-Institutionalism. 
Governance,  18 (1), 35-52.  
Goodin, R. E. Manipulatory Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. 
Grabosky, P. N. (1994). Green Markets: Environmental Regulation by the Private Sector. Law 
and Policy,  16 (4), 419-448.   
Grant, Wyn. “Policy Instruments in the Common Agricultural Policy.” West European Politics 
33, no. 1 (2010): 22-38.   
Gunningham, N & Sinclair, D 1999, 'New Generation Environmental Policy: Environmental 
Management Systems and Regulatory Reform', Melbourne University Law Review, vol. 22, 
no. 3, pp. 592-616. 
Gunningham, N, P. Grabosky & N. Sinclair. 1998. Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental 
Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gunningham, N., and D. Sinclair. “Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for 
Environmental Protection.” Law Policy 21, no. 1 (1999): 49-76.   
Haasnoot, Marjolijn, Jan H. Kwakkel, Warren E. Walker, and Judith ter Maat. “Dynamic 
Adaptive Policy Pathways: A Method for Crafting Robust Decisions for a Deeply Uncertain 
World.” Global Environmental Change (2013).  
Hacker, J. 2004. Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of 
Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States,” American Political Science Review 98 
(2): 243-60. 
Hamelin, Fabrice. “Renewal of Public Policy via Instrumental Innovation: Implementing 
Automated Speed Enforcement in France.” Governance 23, no. 3 (2010): 509-530.   
Hay, Colin, and Nicola Jo-Anne Smith. “How Policy-Makers (Really) Understand Globalization: 
The Internal Architecture of Anglophone Globalization Discourse in Europe.” Public 
Administration 88, no. 4 (2010): 903–927.  
Hickle, Garth T. “Moving Beyond the ‘Patchwork:’ A Review of Strategies to Promote 
Consistency for Extended Producer Responsibility Policy in the US.” Journal of Cleaner 
Production. Accessed August 23, 2013. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2013.08.013. 
 
 
26 
 
Hillier, Bill, and Adrian Leaman. “How is Design Possible: A Sketch for a Theory.” DMG-DRS 
Journal: Design Research and Methods 8, no. 1 (1974): 40-50.   
Hillier, Bill, John Musgrave, and Pat O'Sullivan. “Knowledge and Design.” In Environmental 
Design: Research and Practice, edited by William J. Mitchell, 29.3.1-29.3.14. Los Angeles: 
University of California-Los Angeles, 1972.   
Hippes, G. (1988). New instruments for Environmental Policy: A Perspective. International 
Journal of Social Economics, 15 (3/4), 42-51.  
Holmberg, Sören, and Bo Rothstein. Good Government: The Relevance of Political Science. 
Cheltenham, U.K.; Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2012. 
Hood, C. (1986). The Tools of Government . Chatham: Chatham House Publishers. 
Hood, C. (2007). Intellectual Obsolescence and Intellectual Makeovers: Reflections on the Tools 
of Government After Two Decades. Governance,  20 (1), 127-144.  
Hood, Christopher, and Helen Z. Margetts. The Tools of Government in the Digital Age. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Hood, Christopher. The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government. 
Princeton University Press, 2010. 
Hou, Yilin, and Gene Brewer. “Substitution and Supplementation Between Co- 
Functional  Policy Instruments: Evidence from State Budget  Stabilization  Practices.” 
Public Administration Review 70, no. 6 (2010): 914–924. 
Howlett, M. “Beyond Good and Evil in Policy Implementation: Instrument Mixes, 
Implementation Styles and Second Generation Theories of Policy Instrument Choice.” 
Policy & Society 23, no. 2 (2004): 1-17.  
Howlett, M. “From the “Old” to the “New” Policy Design: Beyond Globalization and 
Collaborative Governance” Policy Sciences. Special issue on Policy Design  (2014b). 
Forthcoming  
Howlett, M. “Managing the ‘Hollow State’: Procedural Policy Instruments and Modern 
Governance.” Canadian Public Administration 43, no. 4 (2000): 412–431. 
Howlett, M. “Policy instruments, policy styles and policy implementation.” Policy Studies 
Journal 19, no. 2 (1991): 1–21-1–21.   
Howlett, M. “The Lessons of Failure: Learning and Blame Avoidance in Public Policy-making.” 
International Political Science Review 33, no. 5 (October 24, 2012): 539–555.  
Howlett, M. (1991). Policy Instruments, Policy Styles, and Policy Implementation: National 
Approaches to Theories of Instrument Choice. Policy Studies Journal,  19 (2), 1-21.  
Howlett, M. (2011). Designing Public Policies: Principles and Instruments . New York: 
Routledge.  
Howlett, M. 2009. "Governance Modes, Policy Regimes and Operational Plans: A Multi-Level 
Nested Model of Policy Instrument Choice and Policy Design" Policy Sciences42:73–89. 
Howlett, M. and J. Rayner. 1995. Do Ideas Matter? Policy Subsystem Configurations and the 
Continuing Conflict Over Canadian Forest Policy. Canadian Public Administration, 38 (3), 
382-410 
Howlett, M., & Ramesh, M. (1993). Patterns of Policy Instrument Choice: Policy Styles, Policy 
Learning and the Privatization Experience. Policy Studies Review., 12 (1), 3-24.  
Howlett, M., M. Ramesh and A. Perl (2009). Studying Public Policy. Canada, Oxford University 
Press. 
Howlett, M., and J. Rayner. “Do Ideas Matter? Policy Subsystem Configurations and the 
Continuing Conflict Over Canadian Forest Policy.” Canadian Public Administration 38, no. 
3 (1995): 382-410.   
Howlett, Michael, and Jeremy Rayner. “Design Principles for Policy Mixes: Cohesion and 
Coherence in 'New Governance Arrangements'.” Policy and Society 26, no. 4 (2007): 1-18.   
Howlett, Michael, and Jeremy Rayner. “Patching Vs Packaging in Policy Formulation: Assessing 
Policy Portfolio Design.” Politics and Governance 1, no. 2 (2013): 170–182. 
 
 
27 
 
Howlett, Michael, and Raul Lejano. “Tales from the Crypt: The Rise and Fall (and Re-Birth?) of 
Policy Design Studies.” Administration & Society 45, no. 3 (2013): 356–380. 
Howlett, Michael, Ishani Mukherjee, and Jun Jie Woo. “The New Design Orientation in Policy 
Formulation Research: From Tools to Toolkits in Policy Instrument Studies.” Policy and 
Politics forthcoming (2014). 
Howlett, Michael. “Policy Analytical Capacity and Evidence-Based Policy-Making: Lessons 
from Canada.” Canadian Public Administration 52, no. 2 (2009b): 153–175. 
Howlett, Michael. “Policy Design: What, Who, How and Why?".” In L’instrumentation et Ses 
Effets, edited by Charlotte Halpern, Lascoumes, Pierre, and Patrick Le Gales. Paris: Presses 
de Sciences Po, 2014. 
Ingram, H.,&  Schneider, A. (1990). Improving Implementation Through Framing Smarter 
Statutes. Journal of Public Policy,  10 (1), 67-88.  
Jacobs, Alan S. “The Politics of When: Redistribution, Investment and Policy Making for the 
Long Term.” British Journal of Political Science 38, no. 2 (2008): 193–220. 
Jarvis, Darryl S. L. Infrastructure Regulation What Works, Why and How Do We Know?: Lessons 
from Asia and Beyond. Singapore: World Scientific, 2011.  
Jordan, A., D. Benson, A. Zito, and Wurzel R. “Environmental Policy: Governing by Multiple 
Policy Instruments?” In Constructing a Policy State? Policy Dynamics in the EU, edited by 
JJ Richardson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Jordan, Andrew, David Benson, Rudiger Wurzel, and Anthony Zito. “Policy Instruments in 
Practice.” In Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, edited by J.S. Dryzek, R.B. 
Norgaard, and D. Schlosberg, 536–49. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Jordan, Andrew, Rudiger Wurzel, and Anthony Zito, “Still the Century of ‘New’ Environmental 
Policy Instruments? Exploring Patterns of Innovation and Continuity.” Environmental 
Politics 22(1): 155–73. 2013 
Junginger, Sabine. “Design and Innovation in the Public Sector: Matters of Design in Policy-
Making and Policy Implementation” 10th European Academy of Design Conference – 
Crafting the Future 
Kay, Adrian. “Tense Layering and Synthetic Policy Paradigms: The Politics of Health Insurance 
in Australia.” Australian Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (2007): 579–591. 
Kern, Florian and Michael Howlett. 2009. Implementing Transition Management as Policy 
Reforms: A Case Study of the Dutch Energy Sector. Policy Science 42(4): 391-408.95–306. 
Keyes, J. M. 1996. ‘Power Tools: The Form and Function of Legal Instruments for Government 
Action’. Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice 10: 133–74. . 
Kingdon, J.W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Boston: Little, Brown, 1984 
Kirschen, E. S., J. Benard, H. Besters, F. Blackaby, O. Eckstein, J. Faaland, F. Hartog, L. 
Morissens, and E. Tosco. Economic Policy in Our Time. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. 
Kiss, Bernadett, Clara González Manchón, and Lena Neij. “The Role of Policy Instruments in 
Supporting the Development of Mineral Wool Insulation in Germany, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.” Journal of Cleaner Production no. 0. Accessed December 29, 2012.  
Kiviniemi, M. “Public Policies and Their Targets: A Typology of the Concept of 
Implementation.” International Social Science Journal 38, no. 108 (1986): 251-266.  
Koch, Philippe. “Overestimating the Shift from Government to Governance: Evidence from 
Swiss Metropolitan Areas.” Governance 26, no. 3 (2013): 397–423.  
Kooiman, J. “Societal Governance: Levels, Models, and Orders of Social-Political Interaction.” In 
Debating Governance, edited by J. Pierre, 138–166. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Landry, R., Varone, F., & Goggin, M. L. (1998). The Determinants of Policy Design: The State of 
the Theoretical Literature. Paper presented to the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago.  
 
 
28 
 
Lascoumes, Pierre and Patrick Le Gales, “Introduction: Understanding public policy through its 
instruments – from the nature of instruments to the sociology of public policy 
instrumentation” Governance 20, no. 1 (2007): 1-21 
Lasswell, H. (1954). Key Symbols, Signs and Icons. In L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, R. M. MacIver, 
and Richard McKean (Eds.),  Symbols and Values: An Initial Study (pp. 77-94). New York: 
Harper & Bros.  
Lasswell, H. D., and D. Lerner. “The Policy Orientation.” In The Policy Sciences: Recent 
Developments in Scope and Method, 3–15. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951. 
Lasswell, H. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Meridian, 1958. 
Lecuyer, Oskar, and Philippe Quirion. “Can Uncertainty Justify Overlapping Policy Instruments 
to Mitigate Emissions?” Ecological Economics 93 (September 2013): 177–191. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.05.009. 
Lecuyer, Oskar, and Ruben Bibas. Combining Climate and Energy Policies: Synergies or 
Antagonism? Modeling Interactions with Energy Efficiency Instruments. SSRN Scholarly 
Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, January 26, 2012. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1992324. 
Lejano, Raul P., and Savita Shankar. “The Contextualist Turn and Schematics of Institutional Fit: 
Theory and a Case Study from Southern India.” Policy Sciences 46, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 
83–102. 
Lindblom, C. E. “The Science of Muddling Through.” Public Administration Review 19, no. 2 
(1959): 79–88. 
Linder, S. H., & Peters, B.G. (1984). From Social Theory to Policy Design. Journal of Public 
Policy,  4 (3), 237-259.  
Linder, S. H., and B. G. Peters. “Policy Formulation and the Challenge of Conscious Design.” 
Eval.Program Planning. 13 (1990): 303-311.   
Linder, S. H., and B. G. Peters. “The Analysis of Design or the Design of Analysis?.” Policy 
Studies Review 7, no. 4 (1988): 738-750.   
Linder, S. H., and B. G. Peters.. “Research Perspectives on the Design of Public Policy: 
Implementation, Formulation, and Design.” In Implementation and the Policy Process: 
Opening up the Black Box, edited by D. J. Palumbo and D. J. Calisto, 51-66. New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1990a.   
Linder, S., and B. G. Peters. “The Design of Instruments for Public Policy.” In Policy Theory and 
Policy Evaluation: Concepts, Knowledge, Causes, and Norms, edited by S. S. Nagel, 103-
119. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990b.   
Linder, Stephen H., and B. Guy Peters. “An Institutional Approach to the Theory of Policy-
Making: The Role of Guidance Mechanisms in Policy Formulation.” Journal of Theoretical 
Politics 2, no. 1 (January 1, 1990c): 59-83.   
Linder, Steven, and B. Peters. “The logic of public policy design: Linking policy actors and 
plausible instruments.” Knowledge, Technology & Policy 4, no. 1 (March 1, 1991): 125-
151.   
Locke, William. “Reconnecting the Research-Policy-Practice Nexus in Higher Education: 
‘Evidence-Based Policy’ in Practice in National and International Contexts.” Higher 
Education Policy 22 (2009): 119–140. 
Lowi, T. J. (1966). Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government. In R. 
B. Ripley (Ed.),  Public Policies and Their Politics: Techniques of Government Control (pp. 
27-40). New York: W.W. Norton.  
Lowi, T. J. (1972). Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice. Public Administration Review, 
32 (4),  298-310.  
Lowi, T. J. (1985). The State in Politics: The Relation Between Policy and Administration. In R. 
G. Noll (Ed.),  Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (pp. 67-105). Berkeley: University 
of California Press.  
 
 
29 
 
MacRae, D., and D. Whittington. Expert Advice for Policy Choice: Analysis and Discourse. 
Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997.   
Majone, G. “On the Notion of Political Feasibility.” European Journal of Political Research 3, no. 
2 (1975): 259–274. 
Majone, Giandomenico. “Choice Among Policy Instruments for Pollution Control.” Policy 
Analysis 2, no. 4 (1976): 589–613. 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J.P. (2004)). The logic of appropriateness. Martin Rein, Michael Moran 
and Robert E. Goodin (eds.), Handbook of Public Policy, Oxford University Press. 
May, P. 2003 Policy Design and Implementation. In B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (Eds.), 
Handbook of Public Administration (pp. 223-233). Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.  
Mayntz, R. (1979). Public Bureaucracies and Policy Implementation. International Social Science 
Journal,  31 (4), 633-645.  
Meijers, Evert. 2004. “Policy Integration: A Literature Review.” In D. Stead, H. Geerlings and E. 
Meijers, ed(s), Policy Integration in Practice: The Integration of Land Use Planning, 
Transport and Environmental Policy-Making in Denmark, England and Germany, Delft: 
Delft university Press: 9-24. 
Meuleman, L. (2009a) Metagoverning Governance Styles: Increasing the Public Manager’s 
Toolbox. Paper presented at the ECPR general conference, Potsdam. 
Meuleman, Louis. “The Cultural Dimension of Metagovernance: Why Governance Doctrines 
May Fail.” Public Organization Review 10, no. 1 (8, 2009b): 49-70.   
Mintrom, Michael. “The Policy Analysis Movement.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of 
the Art, edited by L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 71–84. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2007. 
Mondou, Matthieu, and Éric Montpetit. “Policy Styles and Degenerative Politics: Poverty Policy 
Designs in Newfoundland and Quebec.” Policy Studies Journal 38, no. 4 (November 2010): 
703–722. doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2010.00380.x. 
Montpetit, E. Misplaced Distrust: Policy Networks and the Environment in France, the United 
States, and Canada. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003.   
Moseley, A., and S. Tierney. “Evidence-Based Practice in the Real World.” Evidence & Policy 1, 
no. 1 (2004): 113–119. 
O’Toole, L. J. (2000). Research on Policy Implementation: Assessment and Prospects. Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, 10 (2), 263-288.  
Oikonomou V., Flamos A., and Grafakos S. “Is Blending of Energy and Climate Policy 
Instruments Always Desirable?” Energy Policy 38, no. 8 (August 2010): 4186–4195.  
Oikonomou, V., A. Flamos, D. Zeugolis, and S. Grafakos. “A Qualitative Assessment of EU 
Energy Policy Interactions.” Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy 7, 
no. 2 (2011): 177–187.  
Oikonomou, V., and C. J. Jepma. “A Framework on Interactions of Climate and Energy Policy 
Instruments.” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 13, no. 2 (February 
15, 2007): 131–156.  
Oliphant, Samuel, and Michael Howlett. “Assessing Policy Analytical Capacity: Comparative 
Insights from a Study of the Canadian Environmental Policy Advice System.” Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 12, no. 4 (2010): 439.  
Orren, K., and S. Skowronek. “Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A 
Review of Literature on the 1940s.” Political Science Quarterly 113, no. 4 (1998): 689-
702.    
Parsons, W. “Modernising Policy-Making for the Twenty First Century: The Professional 
Model.” Public Policy and Administration 16, no. 3 (2001): 93–110. 
Parsons, Wayne. Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis 
Aldershot Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1995. 
 
 
30 
 
Peters, B. G., P. Eliadis, M. Hill, and M. Howlett. “Conclusion: The Future of Instruments 
Research.” In Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance, 353–363. 
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005. 
Peters, B.G., & Pierre, J. 1998 Governance Without Government? Rethinking Public 
Administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8 (2), 223-244.  
Radaelli, Claudio M., and Claire A. Dunlop. “Learning in the European Union: Theoretical 
Lenses and Meta-theory.” Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 6 (2013): 923–940. 
doi:10.1080/13501763.2013.781832. 
Ramesh M., and Fritzen, Scott. Eds Transforming Asian Governance: Rethinking Assumptions, 
Challenging Practices. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Ramesh, M., and M. Howlett. Eds Deregulation and Its Discontents: Rewriting the Rules in Asia. 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 2006. 
Rayner, J. “On smart layering as policy design: Tackling the biofuels policy mess in Canada and 
the United Kingdom” Policy Sciences. Special issue on Policy Design  (2013). Forthcoming  
Rayner, J., M. Howlett, J. Wilson, B. Cashore, and G. Hoberg. “Privileging the Sub-Sector: 
Critical Sub-Sectors and Sectoral Relationships in Forest Policy-Making.” Forest Policy and 
Economics 2, no. 3 (2001): 319-332.   
Rhodes, R. A. W. “The New Governance: Governing Without Government.” Political Studies 44 
(1996): 652-667.   
Roch, C., D. Pitts, and I. Navarro. (2010). Representative Bureaucracy and Policy Tools: 
Ethnicity, Student Discipline, and Representation in Public Schools.  Administration & 
Society, 42(1):38-65.   
Rotberg, Robert I. “Good Governance Means Performance and Results.” Governance 27, no. 3 
(July 1, 2014): 511–18. doi:10.1111/gove.12084. 
Sager, Fritz, and Yvan Rielle. “Sorting through the Garbage Can: Under What Conditions Do 
Governments Adopt Policy Programs?” Policy Sciences 46, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 1–21. 
doi:10.1007/s11077-012-9165-7. 
Salamon, L. “Rethinking Public Management: Third Party Government and the Changing Forms 
of Government Action.” Public Policy 29, no. 3 (1981): 255-275.   
Salamon, L. M. (1989). The Tools Approach: Basic Analytics.” In L. S. Salamon and M.S. Lund 
(Eds.). Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action (pp. 23-50). Washington D.C. 
Urban Institute.  
Salamon, L. M. (2002). The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action. In L.M. Salamon 
(Ed.). The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance (pp. 1-47). New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Salamon, L. M. (2002). The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance . New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Saward, M. Co-Optive Politics and State Legitimacy. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992. 
Schneider, A. L., & Ingram, H. (1990). Policy Design: Elements, Premises and Strategies. In S. S. 
Nagel (Ed.).  Policy Theory and Policy Evaluation: Concepts, Knowledge, Causes and 
Norms(pp. 77-102). New York: Greenwood, 1990.  
Schneider, A. L., & Ingram, H. (1997). Policy Design for Democracy. Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas.  
Schneider, A. L., and H. Ingram. “Behavioural Assumptions of Policy Tools.” Journal of Politics 
52, no. 2 (1990a): 511-529.   
Schneider, A., and H. Ingram.  “Social Constructions and Policy Design: Implications for Public 
Administration.” Research in Public Administration 3 (1994): 137-173.  
Schön, D. A. (1988). Designing: Rules, types and words. Design Studies, 9(3), 181-190.  
Schön, D.A. “Designing as reflective conversation with the materials of a design situation.” 
Knowledge-Based Systems 5, no. 1 (March 1992): 3-14.   
 
 
31 
 
Sidney, Mara S. “Policy Formulation: Design and Tools.” In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: 
Theory, Politics and Methods, edited by Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. 
Sidney, 79–87. New Brunswick, N. J.: CRC Taylor & Francis, 2007. 
Sinton, H. 2011. Native Prairie Reclamation. Alberta Environment. 
http://www.albertapcf.org/rsu_docs/pcf_recl-update_final_110917.pdf 
Skodvin, Tora, Anne Therese Gullberg, and Stine Aakre. “Target-group Influence and Political 
Feasibility: The Case of Climate Policy Design in Europe.” Journal of European Public 
Policy 17, no. 6 (2010): 854. doi:10.1080/13501763.2010.486991. 
Stavins, Robert N. “Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice.” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 30, no. 2 (March 1996): 218–232. 
doi:10.1006/jeem.1996.0015. 
Stead, D. and E. Meijers. 2004. Policy integration in practice: some experiences of integrating 
transport, land-use planning and environmental policies in local government. 2004 Berlin 
Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change: Greening of 
Policies – Interlinkages and Policy Integration.  
Sterner, T. (2003). Policy Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management. 
Washington DC: Resource for the Future Press.  
Stokey, E., & Zeckhauser, R. (1978). A Primer for Policy Analysis. New York: Norton.  
Stone, D. A. Policy Paradox and Political Reason. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1988. 
Swanson, Darren, Stephan Barg, Stephen Tyler, Henry Venema, Sanjay Tomar, Suruchi Bhadwal, 
Sreeja Nair, Dimple Roy, and John Drexhage. “Seven Tools for Creating Adaptive Policies.” 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 77, no. 6 (July 2010): 924–939.  
Thelen, K., J. Mahoney, and D. Rueschemeyer. “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from 
Comparative Historical Analysis.” In Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences, 208-240. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.   
Thelen, Kathleen. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, 
the United States and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.   
Timmermans, A., Rothmayr, C., Serduelt, U. and Varone, F. (1998). The Design of Policy 
Instruments: Perspectives and Concepts. Paper presented to the  Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago.  
Tinbergen, Jan. On the Theory of Economic Policy. North-Holland Pub. Co., 1952. 
Tollefson, Chris, Anthony R. Zito, and Fred Gale. “Symposium Overview: Conceptualizing New 
Governance Arrangements.” Public Administration 90, no. 1 (2012): 3–18.  
Torenvlied, R., and A. Akkerman. “Theory of 'Soft' Policy Implementation in Multilevel Systems 
with an Application to Social Partnership in the Netherlands.” Acta Politica 39 (2004): 31-
58.   
Torgerson, D. (1985). Contextual Orientation in Policy Analysis: The Contribution of Harold D. 
Lasswell. Policy Sciences, 18, 240-252.  
Torgerson, D. (1990). Origins of the Policy Orientation: The Aesthetic Dimension in Lasswellʼs 
Political Vision. History of Political Thought, 11 (Summer), 340-344.  
Trebilcock, M. J., & Prichard, J.R.S. (1983). Crown Corporations: The Calculus of Instrument 
Choice. In J.R.S. Prichard ed. Crown Corporations in Canada: The Calculus of Instrument 
Choice (pp:1-50). Toronto: Butterworths..  
Trebilcock, M., & Hartle, D.G. (1982). The Choice of Governing Instrument. International 
Review of Law and Economics, 2, 29-46.  
Tribe, Lawrence H. (1972), “Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs (fall), pp. 66–110. 
 
Tupper, A., & Doern, G.B. (1981). Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada. In Tupper, 
A., & Doern, G.B  eds. Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada (pp. 1-50). 
Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. 
 
 
32 
 
Van der Heijden, Jeroen. “Institutional Layering: A Review of the Use of the Concept.” Politics 
31, no. 1 (January 10, 2011): 9–18.  
Vedung, E., Bemelmans-Videc, M.L. & Rist, R.C. Policy Instruments: Typologies and Theories. 
In Vedung, E., Bemelmans-Videc, M.L. & Rist, R.C. eds. Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: 
Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation (pp.21-58). New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers. 1997 
Walker, Warren E., Vincent A.W.J. Marchau, and Darren Swanson. “Addressing Deep 
Uncertainty Using Adaptive Policies: Introduction to Section 2.” Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change 77, no. 6 (July 2010): 917–923.  
Weaver, Kent. But Will It Work?: Implementation Analysis to Improve Government Performance. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2010. 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/02/implementation-analysis-weaver. 
Weaver, Kent. Target Compliance: The Final Frontier of Policy Implementation. Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution, 2009. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/09/30-
compliance-weaver. 
Weible, Christopher, M., Paul A. Sabatier, and Kelly McQueen. 2009. “Themes and  Variations: 
Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework.” Policy Studies Journal 37(1): 121-140. 
Wildavsky, A. B. Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis. Boston: Little-
Brown, 1979. 
Williams, Russell Alan. “The Limits of Policy Analytical Capacity - Canadian Financial 
Regulatory Reform.” International Journal of Public Sector Management 25, no. 6/7 
(November 7, 2012): 4–4. 
Wintges, Rene. Monitoring and Analysis of Policies and Public Financing Instruments Conducive 
to Higher Levels of R&D Investments: The “Policy Mix” Project - Case Study: The 
Netherlands. Maastricht: UNU-MERIT, 2007. 
Woodside, K. (1986). Policy Instruments and the Study of Public Policy. Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 19 (4), 775-793.  
Yi, Hongtao, and Richard C Feiock. “Policy Tool Interactions and the Adoption of State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards.” Review of Policy Research 29, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 193–
206 
